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arbitration and may also induce increased care in drafting and
utilizing arbitration clauses in form contracts.
A better solution, however, would be legislative enactment of a
single statute of limitations provision applicable to all arbitration
proceedings. 135 This would be the simplest method of standardizing the period of limitations for commencement of arbitration. It is
a logical extension of Paver's attempt to eliminate the difficulties
inherent in characterizing such actions as ex contractu or ex delicto,
and would provide greater certainty than Paver's selection process.
COURT OF CLAIMs ACT

Ct. Cl. Act § 10: Six-month limitationsperiod and date ofjudgment time of
accrual applied to Dole claims.
Section 10 of the Court of Claims Act establishes jurisdictional
notice requirements for the assertion of causes of action against the
State. 3 6 Under subdivision 3 of section 10, a prospective plaintiff
has 90 days within which to file either a claim or a notice of
intention to file a claim for any action against the State grounded in
tort.1 37 Subdivision 4 provides a 6-month time period to file a
notice of intention or a claim against the State for contract actions
and any other claim not specifically covered by the other provisions of section 10.313 Since the landmark decision in Dole v. Dow
135See also The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 530, 566 (1973). A provision
defining the limitation period for commencing arbitration proceedings at either 3 or 4 years
could easily be inserted in CPLR 7502(b). A statutory amendment would provide a more
effective resolution of this issue than does Paver'scase law solution for the simple reason that
the appropriate statute of limitations would be defined with absolute certainty. Indeed, one
student author has suggested enactment of a single statute of limitations for both contract
and tort claims in all proceedings. Comment, Tort in Contract:A New Statute of Limitations, 52
ORE. L. REv. 91 (1972).
16 N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 10 (McKinney 1963). When asserting any cause of action against
the State, compliance with article II of the Court of Claims Act, which includes § 10, is a
prerequisite
for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. § 8.
37
' Id. § 10(3) states:
A claim to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused by
the tort of an officer or employee of the state while acting as such officer or
employee, shall be filed within ninety days after the accrual of such claim unless the
claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to file a claim
therefor, in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after the accrual of
such claim.
13
1 Id. § 10(4) provides:
A claim for breach of contract, express or implied, and any other claim not
otherwise provided for by this section, over which jurisdiction has been conferred
upon the court of claims, shall be filed within six months after the accrual of such
claim, unless the claimant shall within such time file a written notice of intention to
file a claim therefor in which event the claim shall be filed within two years after
such accrual.
The other provisions of § 10 set notice and limitation periods for actions involving State
appropriation of lands or a right, title, or interest in land, id. § 10(1); a wrongful death
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Chemical Co.,"3 9 problems have arisen in interpreting and applying
the various notice requirements of section 10 to apportionment
claims.140 Among the issues still unresolved are: First, which time
period is applicable when filing either a notice or a claim against
the State; and second, when does the cause of action accrue.
In an attempt to resolve these questions, the Court of Claims,
in O'Sullivan v. State, 14 1 declared an apportionment claim to be
within the purview of the 6-month filing period of subdivision 4. In
the same decision, the court also held that a cause of action for
apportionment accrues when a judgment of liability is entered. The
O'Sullivan claimant had satisfied a judgment against her for personal injuries suffered in an automobile accident. Alleging that the
accident was caused, at least in part, by the State's negligence,
claimant then filed a notice of intention to file a claim against New
York for indemnity or apportionment. 42 Contending that the
90-day tort notice period was applicable to Dole claims, the State
moved to dismiss for failure to file timely notice. The court, however, applied the 6-month limitations period of subdivision 4, and
consequently held the apportionment claim to have been season43
ably asserted.'
Deciding the period of limitations issue on the narrow grounds
of statutory construction, Judge DeIorio, the author of the O'Sullivan opinion, ruled that an apportionment claim is not a substantive
tort cause of action within the provisions of subdivision 3. Instead,
the court preferred to view such a claim as falling within the ambit
of the catchall provision of subdivision 4.144 Subsequent decisions
action against the State, id. § 10(2); torts committed by State military personnel, id. § 10(3-a).
Recently enacted subdivision 5 provides for the tolling of the period for presenting a claim
in the case of claimants under a legal disability. Ch. 280, § 1, [1976] N.Y. Laws 705
(McKinney). Additionally, under present subdivision 6, the court has the discretionary
power to permit late filings. Id. § 2.
139 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). For a discussion of the
problems created by Dole, see 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, commentary at 232 (1974).
140 Apportionment claims against the State may only be brought in the Court of Claims.
See McCorkle v. Degl, 74 Misc. 2d 611, 344 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1973)
1403.05.
(mem.); 2A WK&M
141 83 Misc. 2d 426, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
142 Id. at 428-29, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69. The notice of intention to file a claim was filed
more than 2 years after the accident, more than 5 months after the individual defendant was
found liable, and more than 90 days after judgment was entered. Id. at 429, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
769.143
d. at 439, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
144 Id. at 432, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 772-73. Judge Delorio did not feel constrained to take the
further step of integrating the Dole claim neatly within the contract clause of subdivision 4.
Nevertheless, such a ruling would have been entirely consistent with traditional CPLR
concepts, which view indemnity, contribution, and apportionment as quasi-contractual in
nature and thereby governed by the contract limitations period. See CPLR 213. For the
identification of indemnification as a quasi-contractual remedy, see, e.g., Accredited Demoli-
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of the Court of Claims have been in consonance with the O'Sullivan
court on this question, firmly establishing that the time provisions
of subdivision 4 apply to all apportionment claims against the
State.

1 45

The second issue facing the O'Sullivan court was the determination of the date of accrual of a Dole claim against the State. In
choosing the entry of judgment date as the time of accrual, the
court relied on the "cast in damages" language of Dole.1 4 6 The
O'Sullivan court considered a party to be "cast in damages" only
when the extent of damages is ascertained and liability imposed,
i.e., at the entry of judgment. Judge Delorio dismissed the State's
contention that a litigant is "cast in damages" upon the return of
the jury verdict. Although conceding that the verdict is significant,
he maintained that the rights and obligations of the parties are not
fixed until judgment is entered. 147 Similarly, Judge Delorio distion Constr. Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 37 App. Div. 2d 708, 324 N.Y.S.2d 377 (2d Dep't
1971) (mem.); Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1964);
Hansen v. City of New York, 43 Misc. 2d 1048, 252 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1964); Rieger v. Frankstram Realties, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1946). A
similar view of pre-Dole contribution was expressed in Taca Int'l Airlines, S.A. v. Rolls Royce
of England, Ltd., 47 Misc. 2d 771, 263 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). Quasicontractual principles have been applied to Dole claims on the theory that apportionment is
either partial indemnification or a type of contribution. See, e.g., Rock v. Reed-Prentice, 39
N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1976); Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc.,
80 Misc. 2d 756, 364 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975); Sanchez v. Hertz Rental
Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 333 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. Kings County -1972); See also 2
2d § 13:84, at 439 (1965); 2A WK&M
1403.03.
CARMODY-WAIT
45
See Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 970, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Relyea v. State, Claim No. 57973 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 7, 1976); Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v.
State, 84 Misc. 2d 801, 376 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Leibowitz v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 424,
371 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Ct. Cl. 1975). But see Gates-Chili Cent. School Dist. v. State, Claims Nos.
58181, 58204, 58214 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. May 2, 1976), wherein Judge Quigley strongly implied
that he favored the application of the 90-day subdivision 3 provision to apportionment

claims. Judge Quigley later clarified his position in Relyea v. State, supra, by adopting the
6-month period established in subdivision 4. In Leibowitz v. State, supra, Judge Blinder,
although adopting the 6-month limitations period, caused temporary confusion in the Court

of Claims by apparently characterizing an action for apportionment as a claim sounding in
tort. 82 Misc. 2d at 428, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14. See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 174
N.Y.L.J. 113, Dec. 12, 1975 at 1, col. 1. This apparent contradiction was resolved in Bay
Ridge, wherein Judge Blinder explained that he does not consider a Dole claim as sounding
in tort for the purpose of applying an appropriate limitations period, but that he does
consider the date of the tortious act as pertinent for the establishment of the date of accrual.
84 Misc. 2d at 803 n.*, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98 n.*.
W Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d

382, 387 (1972). In Dole, the Court concluded:
[W]here a third party is found to have been responsible for a part, but not all, of

the negligence for which a defendant is cast in damages, the responsibility for that
part is recoverable by the prime defendant against the third party. To reach that

end there must necessarily be an appointment of responsibility in negligence between those parties.
Id.

147 The State relied on Marchese v. City of Albany, 81 Misc. 2d 166, 364 N.Y.S.2d 140
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975), to support its contention that the cause of action accrued
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counted the date of the accident as a viable option, since it would
14 8
fix the accrual date at a time even earlier than the verdict.
In ruling that the earliest possible time of accrual is the date of
judgment, the O'Sullivan court rejected the traditional date-ofpayment rule. 1 4 9 Noting that a Dole claim can be asserted by crossclaim, counterclaim, or impleader before payment, the court concluded that payment is not a prerequisite for the assertion of a
cause of action. Moreover, according to the court, the "cast in
damages" language of Dole does not permit the conclusion that
payment "triggers" the accrual of a cause of action.' 50 Recognizing
that accrual upon the date of judgment would entail considerable
delay, the court reasoned that any further delay caused by postjudgment motions and appeals prior to payment would be imper5
missibly prejudicial to the State.' '
Although Judge DeIorio's rationale indicates that there is a
legal basis for a date-of-judgment position, it is submitted that
purely legal considerations do not mandate abandonment of the
traditional date-of-payment rule. It appears that the O'Sullivan
court seized the "cast in damages" language of Dole as a convenient
tool for reaching what is primarily a public policy determination.
The real merit of the O'Sullivan rule lies in its reasoned balancing
of a person's right to apportionment from the State as a joint
tortfeasor with the State's interest in not being prejudiced by stale
15 2
claims.
upon the jury verdict. Marchese, however, provides only dictum on this point. Furthermore,
an analysis of available case law indicates that the time-of-verdict theory generally has not
been followed.
148 83 Misc. 2d 426, 436-37, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766, 776-77. The O'Sullivan court expressly
considered Gates-Chili Cent. School Dist. v. State, Claims Nos. 58181, 58204, 58214 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. May 2, 1975), wherein Judge Quigley strongly implied that the date-of-neglience rule
should be utilized. Judge Delorio underscored the likelihood that such a position would bar
most third-party claims. For instance, use of the subdivision 4 notice requirements might
require a third-party claimant to file a notice of intention to file a claim almost 2 years
before the principal tort action is brought against him. Utilizing this approach, a potential
defendant often would have to file a claim before receiving any legal notice of his potential
liability. Since deciding Gates-Chili, Judge Quigley has reversed his position and adopted the
O'Sullivan rule. See Relyea v. State, Claim No. 57973 (Ct. Cl. Jan. 7, 1976). Nevertheless,
the date-of-negligence theory is still strongly advocated by Judge Blinder. See note 155 and
accompanying text infra.
149 83 Misc. 2d at 437-39, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78. See note 157 and accompanying text
infra.
i 0 83 Misc. 2d at 438-39, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 777-78. It is well
established by statute and
case law that a Dole cause of action may be asserted before the principal claim is resolved. See,
e.g., CPLR 1403; Valentino v. State, 44 App. Div. 2d 338, 355 N.Y.S.2d 212 (3d Dep't 1974);
Stein v. Whitehead, 40 App. Div. 2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821 (2d Dep't 1972).
1'
83 Misc. 2d at 438-39, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 778.
2
'1 See Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special
Defense Against Action by Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 414-15 (1967).
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The O'Sullivan date-of-judgment rule has not met with unqualified acceptance in the Court of Claims. On the contrary, two
153
distinctly inapposite positions have emerged in recent opinions.
One position, advocated by Judge Blinder in Leibowitz v. State,' 54
maintains that the date of the State's alleged negligence is the time
of accrual. The theory underlying the Leibowitz position is that any
other accrual date for apportionment claims may subject the State
to indirect liability at the hands of a joint tortfeasor although the
State is not directly liable to the injured party because of the
expiration of the 3-year statute of limitations. 55
153 Three time-of-accrual theories have developed in the Court of Claims. See Berlin &
Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 970, 973-78, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778, 780-83 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (Judge
Lengyel - date of payment); Relyea v. State, Claim No. 57973, at 4 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Jan. 7,
1976) (Judge Quigley - date of judgment); O'Sullivan v. State, 83 Misc. 2d 426, 433-39, 371
N.Y.S.2d 766, 773-78 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (Judge Delorio - date ofjudgment); Leibowitz v. State,
82 Misc. 2d 424, 427-29, 371 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (Judge Blinder -date of
negligence).
Although Judge Quigley has endorsed the O'Sullivan date-of-judgment rule for actions
in which a judgment was rendered, Relyea v. State, supra, he advocates application of the
time-of-negligence rule when a voluntary settlement was reached. Gates-Chili Cent. School
Dist. v. State, Claims Nos. 58181, Z8204, 58214 (Ct. Cl. May 2, 1975). It is submitted that
inasmuch as the date ofjudgment rule obviously cannot be applied to a voluntary settlement,
the course followed by Judge Quigley would inhibit resolution of disputes outside of the
courtroom. Therefore, policy considerations alone dictate that the traditional date-ofpayment rule be used where liability has arisen from a settlement.
154 82 Misc. 2d 424, 371 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
'Judge Blinder's date-of-negligence theory is based on a misinterpretation of Barry v.
Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 629, 324 N.E.2d 312, 364 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1974). In Barry, a third-party action was brought against the Village of Kenmore by Niagara
Transit for apportionment of damages assessed against the company in a negligence action
brought by an injured passenger. Niagara alleged that the injury was partially the result of
the village's negligent maintenance of a street curb. The village moved for dismissal on the
ground that it had not received prior notice of the curb defect in compliance with § 341-a of
the Village Law, ch. 837 [1957] N.Y. Laws 1832, now CPLR 9804. The Court ruled that
apportionment applied only where two or more tortfeasors have breached duties owed to
the injured party. Since no prior notice of the defect was given to the village, there was no
duty owed by the village to the injured passenger. Consequently, allowing a third party
action would be imposing liability indirectly where it could not be imposed directly. It was
such an indirect imposition of liability in the absence of any substantive duty that the Court
of Appeals declared impermissible. The Court did not address itself to actions barred
by procedural or limitational provisions after a substantive duty arose. As the Court of
Appeals stated in Rogers v. Dorchester Associates, 32 N.Y.2d 553, 564, 300 N.E.2d 403, 409,
347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 31 (1973): "The rule of apportionment in the Dole case was not intended to
and should not be read to vary the substantive duties as distinguished from the scope of
liability for damages and apportionment ..
" Viewed in this light, it is clear that the Court
of Appeals' ruling in Barry dealt only with determining substantive rights and simply did not
reach the procedural issues surrounding an apportionment claim.
The Leibowitz court also attributed a significant substantive effect on the accrual of Dole
claims to article 14 of the CPLR. Judge Blinder noted that article 14 permits the assertion of
Dole claims prior to either judgment against or payment of a judgment by the claimanttortfeasor. As a result, he reasoned that neither should be a prerequisite to the accrual of
such a cause of action. Article 14, however, is merely a procedural tool for asserting Dole
claims and was not meant to change substantive rights previously established by Dole. See
Slater v. American Mineral Spirits Co., 33 N.Y.2d 443, 449, 310 N.E.2d 300, 303, 354
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Another position, advanced by Judge Lengyel in Berlin &
Jones, Inc. v. State, 15 6 adopts the date-of-payment rule. This theory
enjoys the overwhelming support of authority dealing with Dole
claims outside of the Court of Claims. 5 7 Although Judge Lengyel
acknowledged that the date-of-payment rule involves greater prejudice to the State's defense, he felt that a departure from the
traditional rule should be made only by legislative action.' 5
The O'Sullivan decision and its contradictory counterparts are
apparently irreconcilable. 5 9 Absent an authoritative appellate ruling160 or legislative action, 16 ' there is every reason to believe that
the various judges of the Court of Claims will continue their vigorous advocacy of these inconsistent positions. This inconsistency,
coupled with the unique structure of the Court of Claims, 62 presents particularly difficult problems for the practitioner. 63 When
N.Y.S.2d 620, 625 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting); Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d
970, 975-76, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778, 782 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
:56 85 Misc. 2d 970, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
' See, e.g., Winn v. Peter Bratti Associates, Inc., 80 Misc. 2d 756, 364 N.Y.S.2d 137
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975); Adams v. Lindsay, 77 Misc. 2d 824, 354 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1974), discussed in The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 170, 207 (1974); 7B
MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1007, commentary at 123 (Supp. 1975); 2A WK&M
1401.19, 1403.03;
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 77, 82, 86 (1937); McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 174

N.Y.L.J. 113, Dec. 12, 1975 at 1, col. 1.
158 85 Misc. 2d at 977, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 783. See note 161 infra.
159 The judges of the Court of Claims meet several times a year to coordinate decisions
in an attempt to provide a certain amount of consistency within the system. See McNamara,
The Court of Claims: Its Development and Present Role in the Unified Court System, 40 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 1 (1965). The apportionment decisions, however, decided with full cognizance of their
contradictory nature, evince solidified positions, which in all probability will not be voluntarily abandoned.
160Appeals from judgments or orders of the Court of Claims can only be brought
before the third or fourth departments. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 24 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
161Most of the accrual cases express an interest in legislative resolution of the § 10
imbroglio. See O'Sullivan v. State, 83 Misc. 2d 426, 437, 371 N.Y.S.2d 766, 777 (Ct. Cl.
1975); Berlin & Jones, Inc. v. State, 85 Misc. 2d 970, 977, 381 N.Y.S.2d 778, 783 (Ct. Cl.
1976); Bay Ridge Air Rights, Inc. v. State, 84 Misc. 2d 801, 805, 376 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (Ct.
Cl. 1975); Leibowitz v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 424, 429, 371 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
Recent actions by the legislature, however, do not evidence any inclination to act on this
question. See Occhialino, Contribution, NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE 219, 229-40 (1974), wherein Professor Occhialino advocated the adoption of a
1-year statute of limitations for apportionment claims to run from the date of service of
process in the principal action or from the date of a settlement that occurs prior to a lawsuit.
Since the Judicial Conference did not adopt these proposals, they were not forwarded to the
legislature. See TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 197, 212-18
(1975). It should also be noted that although the legislature recently amended § 10, subdivisions 3, 4, and the issue of accrual, were not changed. See ch. 280 [1976] N.Y. Laws 705
(McKinney).
162 The Court of Claims consists of 17 judges, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 2 (McKinney Supp.
1975), who are assigned to nine districts for trial purposes. N.Y. CT. CL. R. § 1200.2
(McKinney 1975). Consequently, the potential for inconsistency is substantial.
163 The inconsistent application of accrual concepts seemingly could result in widespread forum shopping. This possibility is somewhat tempered however, since claims may be
asserted only in the trial district in which the principal cause of action arose. N.Y. CT. CL. R.
§ 1200.2 (McKinney 1975).
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asserting a Dole claim before a judge who has not yet declared his
position - and they are an overwhelming majority1 6 4 - a claimant
will be best advised to file a claim against the State within 6 months
of the date of negligence. Such a course of action would, in all
instances, preserve the tortfeasor's claim for apportionment.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 20.20(2)(b): Criminal jurisdiction over out-of-state conduct
threatening New York's community welfare withheld.
Section 20.20(2) of the CPL permits New York courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain types of criminal conduct having a
deleterious effect in New York although the criminal acts themselves have been performed in another state. 1 65 Departing from the
traditional territorial theory of jurisdiction,' 6 6 the statute is based
upon the concept of "the injured forum.' 6 7 As the name implies,
x1"Out of the 17 judges in the Court of Claims, only Judges Blinder, Delorio, Lengyel
and Quigley have declared their positions.
165CPL § 20.20(2) provides state criminal courts with jurisdiction to convict a person of
an offense:
Even though none of the conduct constituting such offense may have occurred
within this state [if]:
(a) The offense committed was a result offense and the result occurred within this
state. If the offense was one of homicide, it is presumed that the result, namely the
death of the victim, occurred within the state if the victim's body or a part thereof
was found herein; or
(b) The statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a
particular effect in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed
was performed with intent that it would have such effect herein; or
(c) The offense committed was an attempt to commit a crime within this state; or
(d) The offense committed was conspiracy to commit a crime within this state and
an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurred within this state ....
16 Under the common law territorial theory of jurisdiction, a sovereign state has
jurisdiction over all crimes committed within its borders. See Ludwig, Improving New York's
New Criminal Procedure Law, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 387, 396-400 (1971).
167 For a discussion of the injured forum theory of jurisdiction, see id. at 397-98. The
injured forum concept appears to be an offshoot of the territorial theory and has been
termed "objective territorial jurisdiction." United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113,
115 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Jurisdiction based on the concept of the injured f rum can be traced
through the leading case of Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911), wherein defendant was
indicted in Michigan for bribery and the use of false pretenses to defraud that State. In spite
of the fact that the alleged criminal acts occurred entirely in Illinois, the State of Michigan
was deemed to have jurisdiction, since "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of
the harm .... " Id. at 285 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The federal courts have
recognized the "objective territorial jurisdiction" theory in the prosecution of crimes committed in a foreign jurisdiction that have resulted in harmful effects in the United States.
See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974) (prosecution in United States
for uttering stolen American checks in Mexico); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (jurisdiction asserted over conspiracy conducted abroad
which resulted in successful smuggling of drugs into United States); cf. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F.
Supp. 1167, 1174 (D.N.J. 1975); Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F.
Supp. 594, 600 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd mem., 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 927 (1958).

